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"Can it be presumed, that Persons sworn to execute the laws, shall openly
counteract and violate them?"'
I.
The Constitution is explicit: The President "shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed." Lurking, however, within
that seemingly unambiguous language are several constitutional
problems-some resolved, some partially resolved, some the sub-
ject matter of continuing controversy. As the power of the Presi-
dency has aggrandized since 1789, particularly during the past half
century, the question of the meaning to be given to that
phrase-and by whom-in different contexts has moved to the
forefront of issues involving the separation of governmental pow-
ers. This Essay will use the label "separation of governmental pow-
ers," although it long has been known that the constitutional
scheme calls for separate institutions sharing power-quite a dif-
ferent thing.2
* Professor Emeritus of Law, The George Washington University.
1. M. KAMMEN, PEOPLE OF PARADOX; AN INQUIRY CONCERNING THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
CIVILIzATION 42 (1973). The statement originally appeared in the Independent Reflector, a
New York weekly newspaper, in 1753.
2. See R. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER. THE POLITICS OF LEADERSHIP WITH REFLEC-
TIONS ON JOHNSON AND NIXON 101 (1976) ("The constitutional convention of 1787 is sup-
posed to have created a government of 'separated powers'. It did nothing of the sort. Rather,
it created a government of separated institutions sharing powers.") (emphasis added). Dean
Don K. Price bids us "to quit talking about the Constitutional separation of powers." D.
PRICE, AMERICA'S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: SCIENCE, RELIGION, AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBIL-
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This Essay addresses the faithful-execution provision in four
discrete areas: (1) Presidential power when the Constitution is
silent-here "reason of state" (raison d'etat) is the focus of atten-
tion; (2) the Presidency and statutory mandates-a recent decision
in the Third Circuit provides a point of departure; (3) the question
of the President's constitutional duty to enforce Supreme Court
decrees-Cooper v. Aarons is the principal center of attention
here; and (4) the President and international law-the Executive's
recent actions with respect to the International Court of Justice
offer a factual context for discussion of these principles. In speak-
ing of the President and his duty to faithfully execute the laws, I
shall make reference not only to the Chief Executive himself, but
also the institutional Presidency and to that congeries of agencies,
departments, and bureaus that make up what usually is called the
executive branch. In legal theory, those who are the officers of that
branch ultimately are responsible to the President, and he ulti-
mately is responsible for their actions. Only the so-called indepen-
dent regulatory commissions fall, in legal theory, outside the ambit
of Presidential duty.
Neither history nor logic provides answers to the questions
swirling around the faithful-execution provision: history in the
sense of an accurate determination of the framers' intentions, logic
in the sense that constitutional decisions can be syllogistic deriva-
tions from the constitutional text. What is known about what took
place in the Constitutional Convention is of little help; neither are
The Federalist Papers, those propaganda essays written by
Madison, Hamilton, and Jay to manipulate opinion toward favor-
ing the new constitution. Some insight can be gleaned from law
created by the Supreme Court and other organs of government,
but that gloss is far from definitive. As for logic, here as elsewhere
it is only by a transparent fiction that constitutional decisions are
deduced from the spare text of the document of 1787.
We have come to know, moreover, that since 1789-when the
new government came into being-the development of the Consti-
tution has been determined more by what Alexander Hamilton
called "accident and force" than by some supposedly immutable
truths set forth on parchment. The Constitution is now, and
ITY 135 (1983). Surely he is correct. For discussion, see Miller, Myth and Reality in Ameri-
can Constitutionalism, 63 TEx. L. REV. 181, 191-94 (1984) (reviewing the Price book).
3. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). For discussion, see Miller, Constitutional Decisions as De Facto




always has been, relative to circumstances. Each generation of
Americans, therefore, writes its own constitution. Some do not like
that conclusion, but it is beyond reasonable doubt that the Consti-
tution today is tied to the original formulation only in symbolic
and metaphorical ways. Woodrow Wilson made the point in 1908:
"[G]overnment is not a machine, but a living thing. It falls, not
under the theory of the universe, but under the theory of organic
life. It is modified by its environment, necessitated by its tasks,
shaped to its functions by the sheer pressure of life."' 4 That people
differ in their perceptions of those tasks and pressures does not
belie Wilson's assertion.
The assertion holds true for the faithful-execution duty of the
President. This Essay concludes that a) the meaning of the word
"laws" in the Article II provision is not definitively settled; (b) the
President has varying degrees of discretion, depending upon the
particular law at issue, to execute the laws; (c) normatively, the
Chief Executive's discretion should be reined in and circumscribed
in some manner; (d) those in the executive branch at times assert
the power to make independent judgments on the constitutional
validity of certain governmental acts; and (e) the ultimate result is
that here, as elsewhere in constitutional disputes, the play of polit-
ics, rather than the interdicts of those external standards called
law, usually settles specific arguments. This, it should go without
saying, is quite contrary to the precepts of a government of laws,
not of men. In what follows, I shall pay attention to an aspect of
what at times is called the "living constitution," rather than to
what I elsewhere have called the operational code of American con-
stitutionalism (or the "secret constitution," there being a system of
constitutional dualism in the United States).5 The term "living
constitution" refers to the ways in which the meanings of the liti-
gable ambiguities in the Constitution of 1787 have evolved over the
decades. It does not refer to the institutions of the secret (or sec-
ond) constitution, for example, the rise of political parties to con-
stitutional status.
4. W. WILSON, CONSTITUrTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 56 (1908).
5. Miller, Pretense and Our Two Constitutions, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 375, 375 (1986).
See also A. MILLER, THE SECRET CONSTITUTION AND THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE




What the Constitution does not say is often as significant as
what it does say. The ready example here is judicial review. For
present purposes, this Essay will focus upon the President's exer-
cise of the constitutional reason of state "doctrine"-what John
Locke called the "prerogative."
What is reason of state and how is it relevant to the present
discussion? Not mentioned in the document of 1787-although one
could say that the Bill of Rights was an effort to place reasons of
freedom and liberty on par with, or perhaps superior to, reasons of
state-reason of state is "the State's first Law of Motion,"' "the
doctrine that whatever is required to ensure the survival of the
state must be done by the individuals responsible for it, no matter
how repugnant such an act may be to them in their private capac-
ity as decent and moral men."'7 Whoever rules, under whatever sys-
tem of government, always follows principles of reason of state.
Some, like the French, have the doctrine written into their consti-
tutions. Its absence in the American Constitution has not pre-
vented, and does not now prevent, Presidents from following its
dictates. American constitutional history is replete with examples
of use of the principle-not in so many words, to be sure, for poli-
ticians, courts, and commentators alike speak in terms of the docu-
ment of 1787 and its amendments. Nonetheless, it is a fair and
accurate inference from our constitutional history that raison
d'etat is as much a part of our fundamental law as is the written
word itself.
This is not the time or place to discuss the idea of reason of
state comprehensively. That has been done elsewhere. Suffice it for
now to note that the doctrine received its constitutional imprima-
tur in The Prize Cases, which sustained President Lincoln's block-
ade of southern ports during the early days of the Civil War. Said
the Supreme Court: "Whether the President in fulfilling his duties
as Commander-in-Chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met
with armed resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions
as will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents,
is a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be gov-
6. F. MEINECKE, MACHIAVELLISM: THE DOCTRINE OF RAISON D'ETAT AND ITS PLACE IN
MODERN HISTORY 1 (D. Scott trans. 1957).
7. C. FRIEDRICH, CONSTITUTIONAL REASON OF STATE: THE SURVIVAL OF THE CONSTITU-
TIONAL ORDER 4-5 (1957). See Miller, Reason of State and the Emergent Constitution of
Control, 64 MINN. L. REV. 585 (1980).
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erned by the decisions and acts of the political department to
which this was entrusted . . . . 'He [the President] must deter-
mine what degree of force the crisis demands.' " A constitutional
silence had been filled; reason of state became an operative princi-
ple of our fundamental law.
This is Machiavellianism pure and simple. The Florentine
wrote: "[R]epublics which, when in imminent danger, have re-
course neither to a dictatorship, nor to some form of authority
analogous to it, will always be ruined when grave misfortune be-
falls them."9 Machiavelli's insight is central to an understanding of
American constitutionalism, although his precept should be modi-
fied to note that the dangers that have triggered extraordinary re-
sponses have not been limited to "grave misfortune." Major wars
are one thing, but also notable are so-called limited or "brushfire"
engagements (as in Grenada and the Dominican Republic), inter-
nal subversion (actual or supposed), economic depressions, labor
strife, actions of dissident groups, and natural disasters.
The central idea is that the ruling elite must consider a given
situation to be an emergency before extraordinary, even extracon-
stitutional, action is contemplated. In his writings Machiavelli
plunged a sword "into the flank of the body politic of Western
humanity, causing it to shriek and rear up."'10 The pain of that
sword's thrust is still with us. If ever we stop feeling it, it will not
be because the conditions that occasioned the pain have for some
reason disappeared, but because our nerves have gone dead. This
contradiction in American constitutionalism has never been con-
fronted directly and certainly never reconciled.
What may we conclude about constitutional reason of state as
exercised in the United States? First, government officers who
employ extraordinary powers gloss over their acts with a counter-
pane of a more pleasing label, such as the "interests of society,"
the "national interest," the "public interest," and the like. Next,
reason of state makes nonsense out of the running controversy be-
tween interpretivists and noninterpretivists that has cluttered up
law journals in recent years. To my knowledge, none of the partici-
pants in the debate has ever called attention to the Constitution's
silences, of which reason of state is a major one, that have been
and are being filled in a completely noninterpretivist manner.
8. 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 670 (1862).
9. I N. MACHIAVELLI, THE DISCOURSES OF NlCCoLO MACHIAVELLI § 34, at 291 (L. Walker
ed. & trans. 1975).
10. F. MEINECKE, supra note 6, at 49.
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Third, all branches of the national government cooperate in
the employment of reason of state. The President exercises well-
nigh unfettered discretion in accordance with his interpretation of
the public good. He follows Lockean principles. Congress usually
goes along, largely having lost-if it ever really had-the will to
govern. The Supreme Court, when push comes to shove, acts as an
arm of the Executive. Beginning with The Prize Cases (and per-
haps earlier) and running through Haig v. Agee and Snepp v.
United States, there is an almost undeviating line of decisions that
add up to the proposition that the state always wins in any case
considered important by the ruling elite.1 The Steel Seizure
Case12 is not to the contrary, for there the Presidential actions
would have been sustained had President Truman seen fit to ask
Congress to enact a statute validating the seizure of the steel mills.
Fourth, and of greatest present importance, the "law" that the
President and other executive officers "execute" in filling this great
constitutional silence simply does not exist, however "law" may be
defined. The President, therefore, is executing no law, but follow-
ing the great political principle of necessity. The problem this
poses is obvious: the notion of a government under law is lost. Per-
haps the concept never existed, except in the myth system. The
exercise of reason of state's further meaning is that the spirit of
the Constitution, which calls in its separation of powers for
accountability in the exercise of power, is flouted. That means that
no criteria survive by which exercises. of constitutional reason of
state may be adjudged. It is politics, and politics alone, that
prevails. Moreover, there is a further unsolved problem. As Milton
recognized, necessity-the rationale for raison d'tat-is the plea
of every tyrant: "[A]nd with necessity, The tyrant's plea, excused
his devilish deeds."'"
We therefore are left with a constitutional anomaly. Unless
one is willing to recognize an untapped reservoir of "inherent"
powers resting in the Presidency, we must confront the fact that
we often are ruled by executive fiat. President Lincoln knew this.
He asked on July 4, 1861: "Is there in all republics this inherent
and fatal weakness? Must a government be too strong for the lib-
erties of the people, or too weak to maintain its own existence? '1 4
11. 453 U.S. 280 (1981); 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
12. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
13. J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST bk. IV, 1. 393, at 219 (A. Fowler ed. 1971).
14. C. ROSSITER, CONSTITUTIONAL DICTATORSHIP: CRISIS GOVERNMENT IN MODERN
DEMOCRACIES 1 (1948) (quoting a message to Congress by President Lincoln).
394 [Vol. 40:389
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Lincoln simply ignored law and the constitutional processes, saying
(although he came into office "with little more than acute under-
standing of his obligation to see to the due execution of the
laws" 15),
It became necessary for us to choose whether, using only the existing means,
agencies, and processes which Congress had provided, I should let the Gov-
ernment fall at once into ruin, or whether, availing myself of the broader
powers conferred by the Constitution in cases of insurrection, I would make
an effort to save it, with all its blessings, for the present age and for
posterity.' 6
That is eloquent, but obviously flawed. Those "broader powers"
simply cannot be found in the Constitution. Lincoln governed by
flat.
The net conclusion must be this: Among the "laws" that the
President must faithfully execute is constitutional reason of state,
or in other words, the laws of politics. Presidents do those acts that
the political process permits. A straight line runs from the Whis-
key Rebellion of 1794 to the "covert" war in Central America, and
it no doubt will continue to run. Unless Congress intervenes, which
it is not at all likely to do, there is no way that anyone can stop the
President by acting "within the system." The judiciary is not only
the least dangerous branch; it is a sapless and toothless branch in
such circumstances, even though the writ of the Supreme Court
now can run against the President qua Chief Executive.17
III.
We turn now to the much more obvious problem raised by the
Presidential faithful-execution duty-the Executive's power to
ignore or refuse to obey statutes. Two questions regarding this
power may be identified: (1) Can the Executive contest the consti-
tutionality of federal statutes in litigation? (2) Of more present im-
portance, can he constitutionally refuse to execute laws, or por-
tions thereof, that he does not like and about which he at times
expresses constitutional reservations? The latter is the focus of
attention at this time. A recent decision in the Third Circuit,
Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Engineers,18 pro-
vides a basis for sharpening the discussion.
As for the first question, a colleague and I have discussed it in
15. N. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY 31 (1932).
16. 4 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT 78 (J. Richardson ed. 1897).
17. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
18. 787 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1986).
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detail elsewhere,19 so there is no need to repeat what was said
there, save to emphasize that no court yet has expressed dissent or
even reservations about the Department of Justice's challenging
the constitutional validity of some statutes. The Supreme Court in
INS v. Chadha20 permitted the Justice Department to piggyback
on Mr. Chadha's personal lawsuit. It appears, therefore, that the
present Court perceives no constitutional problem with the execu-
tive branch's power to contest the validity of federal statutes,
although I consider this to be a profoundly erroneous judicial
position.
Judicially challenging the constitutionality of a statute may
not be tantamount to refusing to obey the statute, but it comes
close. Ameron presents the latter question of refusal to obey. The
Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), acting
on the advice of the Attorney General, issued a directive to execu-
tive departments and agencies to disregard certain provisions of
the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA). Thus, Ameron is im-
portant because it concerned a Presidential attempt to make an
independent determination of the constitutionality of certain stat-
utes and a refusal to execute those that he did not think met the
constitutional test. Ameron involved the powers of the General Ac-
counting Office-more specifically, the Comptroller General-but
that is not of present interest. Nor is Bowsher v. Synar,21 a some-
what analogous case involving the Comptroller General. The only
issue of present relevance is an order from the OMB to executive
agencies to proceed with the procurement process "as though no
such [stay] provisions were contained in the act." The Third Cir-
cuit was not persuaded: "This claim of right for the President to
declare statutes unconstitutional and to declare his refusal to exe-
cute them, as distinguished from his undisputed right to veto, crit-
icize, or even refuse to defend in court, statutes which he regards
as unconstitutional is dubious at best."
Surely, the court was correct. To say that the President's duty
to faithfully execute the laws implies a power to forbid their execu-
tion is to flout the plain language of the Constitution. This was
acknowledged by then Assistant Attorney General William H.
19. Miller & Bowman, Presidential Attacks on the Constitutionality of Federal Stat-
utes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIO ST. L. J. 51 (1979).
20. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
21. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986); Seventh Report of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions, H. R. REP. No. 138, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) ("The President's suspension of the




It is in our view extremely difficult to formulate constitutional theory to jus-
tify a refusal by the President to comply with a Congressional directive to
spend. It may be argued that the spending of money is inherently an execu-
tive function, but the execution of any law, is by definition, an executive
function and it seems an anomalous proposition that because the Executive
Branch is bound to execute the laws, it is free to decline to execute them.
22
To think otherwise would be to indulge in a feat of splendid illogic.
The argument for executive refusal to obey statutory man-
dates ultimately rests on the single rationale that the President
takes an oath to uphold both the Constitution and the laws and
that the Chief Executive is entitled to take an independent view of
whether a given congressional enactment is constitutionally valid.
In the language of Fred F. Fielding, counsel to President Reagan,
"There are times when the Administration has been accused of ig-
noring the law. But remember that the President is sworn to up-
hold both the Constitution and the laws. We seek to resolve con-
flicts. Strong presidents especially are mindful of their
responsibilities to those who come after them, and seek to assure
that they do not erode any executive prerogative." 3 Some statutes,
furthermore, are sufficiently ambiguous as to permit a great deal of
discretion in their execution.
The Presidential position is disingenuous at best. It assumes
the answer and calls it a reason. Fielding merely restated the basic
issue in his defense. To permit his reasoning to prevail would
mean, at the very least, that the President would be able to exer-
cise an informal line-item veto over those portions of statutes he
does not like. At worst, adoption of Fielding's reasoning would
mean that Chief Executives are above and beyond the laws passed
by Congress. That conclusion would render the constitutional
scheme completely awry; the United States would then have a king
for president, someone who would in fact be superior, rather than
equal, in title and dignity to the Supreme Court and the Congress.
It should not be forgotten that James St. Clair, when he argued
United States v. Nixon for then President Nixon, let the Court
know that under the Constitution the President might not be
required to obey the writ of the Court should it be adverse.
The conclusion, therefore, is unavoidable. The President does
22. Quoted in J. BARRON & C. DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINcIPLES AND POLICY
284 (1982).
23. Quoted in Tolchin, As Laws are Flouted, Congress Seethes, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13,
1985, at 19, col. 3.
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not have an item veto, as he sought to exercise in Ameron, nor
does he have the right under the Constitution to flout entire stat-
utes. Once Congress enacts a statute, whether over a Presidential
veto or with his approval, the President is duty bound to enforce
it, as are other officers in the executive branch. The President's
alternative is that set forth in the Constitution-to propose legisla-
tion in the hope that Congress will change its mind.
That, however, is the easy case. A statute is a law within the
terms of the faithful-execution clause (of that there can be no
doubt). To "execute" a statute, as Senator Sam J. Ervin often re-
minded executive officers, emphatically does not mean to kill it.
Execution means implementation. A tougher problem arises when
an executive officer does not brazenly flout the congressional will,
as in Ameron, but rather simply does not follow what seems to be
the clear legislative intention and does not take reasonably ade-
quate steps to enforce some statutes. The officer simply permits
the statute to fall into desuetude. For example, the Reagan admin-
istration delayed for eighteen months the issuance of regulations
that would execute or enforce the Infant Formula Act of 1980. Said
Senator Albert Gore, Jr.: "They absolutely refused to obey the
law.
2 4
The point need not be labored. With the rise of the "bureau-
cratic state," Congress has delegated large chunks of governing
power to the public administration. About four hundred public
laws are enacted each year. There is no way, at least no known
way, that either Congress or the judiciary can oversee the imple-
mentation of the details of the statutes in the United States Code,
save in the occasional case that does get to court when some per-
son, natural or corporate, believes that his, her, or its rights have
been trampled upon. The bureaucracy makes millions of decisions
annually. It would be puerility compounded to think that those
officers charged with the administration of statutes do not exercise
discretion in choosing which road to take in implementation. In
this connection, it is relevant to invite attention to what may be a
"law" of bureaucratic behavior: The higher one is in the bureau-
cracy, the more discretion he or she may exercise. Stated con-
versely, those lowest in the administrative pecking order have the
least discretion. In any event, it requires no documentation (for it
is common knowledge) that different political administrations




others casually ignore them.
The net conclusion, accordingly, is clear. Although executive
officers, including the President, are duty bound to execute the
laws that Congress enacts, that is true only under the mandate of
the formal Constitution. The secret constitution (or operational
code) differs considerably. Executive officers, particularly those in
high-level positions, administer statutes as they think is best
(rather than as Congress spoke) and are limited only by the pres-
sures of politics, including judicial decisions, rather than by the
interdicts of law. The President does what the political process
allows him to do-or to get away with.
IV.
That courts, particularly the Supreme Court (although not
exclusively), are lawmakers is one of the commonplaces of the day.
Are those judge-made laws to be included in the "laws" that the
President must faithfully execute? There is no ready answer to
this question. For that matter, to my knowledge no one has ever
raised the question before. Surely, however, any comprehensive
analysis of the faithful-execution duty must confront the problem.
This section concentrates more on posing the question than on
providing a definitive answer, but does conclude that there is no
logical reason why Supreme Court decrees should not be treated in
the same way as congressional statutes.
Even members of the present Supreme Court have recognized
the lawmaking powers of the judiciary. For example, Justice Wil-
liam Brennan wrote in 1980 that "[u]nder our system, judges are
not mere umpires, but, in their own sphere, lawmakers-a coordi-
nate branch of government. 2 5 The interpretation and application
of constitutional and statutory law, while not legislation, is law-
making. Justice Byron White commented similarly in his dissent-
ing opinion in Miranda v. Arizona: "The Court has not discovered
or found the law in making today's decision, nor has it derived
from some irrefutable sources; what it has done is to make new law
and new public policy in much the same way that it has done in
the course of interpreting other great clauses of the Constitu-
tion. ' 26 Supreme Court decisions, therefore, are de facto class
actions-with the class being the entire nation-unless, as in Pick-
25. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 595 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
26. 384 U.S. 436, 531 (1966) (White, J., dissenting).
1987]
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ering v. Board of Education,27 the Justices expressly limit the
thrust of their decisions.
Cooper v. Aaron, the Little Rock school desegregation case,
amply illustrates that the Justices themselves view their decisions
as stating "the supreme law of the land." Cooper is a major mile-
stone in Supreme Court history, for it marked the first time that
the Court overtly conceded that it was making constitutional law.
In so doing, the Justices accomplished the neat feat of doing the
logically impossible-inferring a general principle from one partic-
ular. The meaning in constitutional terms should be mentioned:
great changes in the American system are being brought about
under old forms. The form of adjudication remains, and the adver-
sary system is still employed, but the Court's role has been altered
substantially in recent decades. In other words, the formal Consti-
tution adheres to a legal theory that says the Justices merely de-
cide "the law of the case," but the secret constitution or opera-
tional code recognizes that they decide "the law of the land."28
As "laws," then, Supreme Court decisions surely fall within
the ambit of the faithful-execution clause. The Presidential duty,
therefore, becomes utterly clear-to faithfully execute those laws.
Do not ignore them and do not seek to have them overturned in
subsequent litigation: this seems to be the command of the
Constitution.
Reality differs. Presidents and executive officers, unless
directly affected by Supreme Court decrees, simply do not consider
themselves to be bound by them or to have a duty to enforce them.
There is no transference of, say, a Supreme Court administrative
law decision concerning the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to an
action taken in similar factual circumstances by some other execu-
tive agency. Administrative law is less a horizontal corpus of prin-
ciples and rules affecting all public administration than a series of
discrete corpora of principles and rules, each dealing with a sepa-
rate agency or department. The President qua Chief Executive
never has seen fit to execute judge-made laws of public administra-
27. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
28. This is the gravamen of Attorney General Edwin Meese's recent attack on the
Supreme Court. Address by Att'y Gen. Edwin Meese, Tulane University (Oct. 21, 1986)
excerpted in LEGAL TIMES OF WASH. D.C., Oct. 27, 1986, at 12. Whether Supreme Court
decisions are in fact "the law of the land" may be said to be an as yet unresolved constitu-
tional question-although it is fair to say that the majority of informed observers disagree




tion across the board, even with the existence of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, whose spirit would seem to call for precisely
that Presidential action.
Modern-day Presidents go even further. They contest, when
possible, the validity of some Supreme Court decisions. INS v.
Chadha29 is instructive in this regard. In that case the Justice De-
partment piggybacked upon Mr. Chadha's lawsuit and helped to
persuade the Supreme Court to invalidate the one-house legislative
veto provision of the applicable statute. Mr. Chadha won, but the
more important winner was the executive branch. The case, there-
fore, should be styled Congress v. the President, for that was pre-
cisely what was involved, although neither branch was a primary
party in the litigation.
This is too much. Although the question of the propriety of
the Executive's challenging the constitutionality of duly enacted
federal statutes has never been confronted directly by the Supreme
Court, surely there is no warrant, either in the Constitution or the
relevant statutes, for the Department of Justice so to act. Only by
equating the executive branch with "the" government or "the"
United States can it be said that the Department is adhering to its
statutory responsibility set forth in 28 United States Code section
2403. That section provides for the Department's appearance on
behalf of the United States when a congressional act's constitu-
tionality is involved. The section's purpose was to accord the "gov-
ernment the right to defend the constitutionality of the law of the
land. No longer must the Government stand idly by, a helpless
spectator, while Acts of Congress are stricken down by the
Courts." 30 That statement by President Franklin D. Roosevelt
came in 1937. Fifty years later, the original purpose of the law has
been reversed; the United States has, in the eyes of the Depart-
ment of Justice, become the executive branch. Cavalierly disre-
garding their duty to enforce the Constitution and the laws of Con-
gress, lawyers, in the Justice Department attack the
constitutionality of statutes and Supreme Court decisions of which
the President does not approve. This will not do. The Constitution
did not establish a regal president who may pick and choose from
among the laws-legislative or judicial-that are to be executed.
Finally, the Supreme Court in the famous Neagle31 case held
29. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
30. White House Press Release, Aug. 25, 1937, at 2, reprinted in 122 CONG. REC.
S17,084 (Sept. 29, 1976). See Miller & Bowman, supra note 19.
31. In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
1987]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
an Attorney General's regulation was to be "a law of the United
States," a holding that could provide the basis for the regulation's
faithful execution. In Cooper v. Aaron the Court unanimously
rejected an argument that the President's take-care duty did not
permit the use of troops to enforce Brown v. Board of Education
because, so the argument went, only statutes are to be included in
the term "laws" in the faithful-execution clause. No one yet has
tried to extend Cooper to other situations and thus to compel the
President to execute other judicial decrees. Perhaps the time has
come, however, for serious attention to be paid to this issue.
All of this is not to suggest, as did President Lincoln in his
first inaugural address in 1861, that the people will have
"resigned" the conduct of the government to the Supreme Court.
Far from it. Executive enforcement of judicial decrees would be
limited by the very fact that the invisible, but nonetheless existent,
cords that bind judicial activity would not be thrown out. Congress
too has an undetermined amount of authority to regulate the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. The Court is not a rogue elephant,
given to going off on frolics of its own. Rather, it is a constituent
part of government. We should bear in mind Professor Martin
Shapiro's observation: "No regime is likely to allow significant po-
litical power to be wielded by an isolated judicial corps free of po-
litical restraints. 3 2 Judges are part and parcel of the political
regime.
V.
Is international law a part of the corpus of laws that the Presi-
dent must faithfully execute? This section explores that question.
We begin with the assumption that international law really is law,
as Professor Anthony d'Amato recently concluded.3 3 As Ambassa-
dor Philip Jessup observed thirty years ago, international law is
adhered to as much as municipal law .
3
International law, furthermore, is part of the law of the United
States. To the extent, for example, that international law may be
found in treaties, it is part of "the supreme law of the land" pursu-
ant to Article VI. (Of course, there is more to international law
than that embodied in treaties, but attention here will focus on the
United States' treaty obligation with respect to the International
32. M. SHAPIRO, CoURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 34 (1981).
33. D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"?, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1293 (1984).
34. P. JESSUP, TRANSNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (1957).
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Court of Justice (ICJ).) This has been so since the beginning. The
participants in the Constitutional Convention "had a knowledge of
contemporary legal thought .... It was axiomatic among them
that the Law of Nations, applicable to individuals and to states,
was an integral part of the law which they administered or prac-
ticed. ' ' 35 Chief Justice John Marshall agreed. He "accepted the
binding force of international law upon courts of the United States
with no apparent difficulty.
3 6
Can then the President refuse to obey or, to put it more
strongly, violate international law? The answer must come on two
levels. First, under the "norms" of the operational code, the Presi-
dent simply can take actions contrary to international law or even
the solemn promises in treaties. This may be seen, to take only one
example, in the manner in which the United States has refused to
adhere to the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice with respect to disputes arising in Central America. Rely-
ing upon Professor Louis Henkin's Foreign Affairs and the Consti-
tution, Justice Department lawyers contend that "[t]he Constitu-
tion does not forbid the President. . .to violate international law,
and the courts will give effect to acts within the constitutional
powers of the political branches without regard to international
law."' 37 This, to put it bluntly, simply is too much. Even Henkin, a
former State Department functionary, concedes that "there are no
clear Supreme Court holdings, or even explicit dicta, upholding the
power of the President to act contrary to international law.
' 88
There can be no question that the President acted unconstitution-
ally in unilaterally amending the ICJ treaty and in refusing to fol-
low the decision of the ICJ in Nicaragua's lawsuit against the
United States.
Second, it is clear beyond doubt that power is one thing, law
another. The President was able to succeed in his amendment of a
treaty and his cavalier refusal to adhere to the ICJ's decision, but
only because of a lack of an appropriate enforcement mechanism.
The norms of the formal Constitution cannot sustain these actions.
"Whether President Reagan's 1984 modification of the 1946 Decla-
35. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United States,
101 U. PA. L. REv. 26, 35-36 (1952).
36. B. ZEIGLER, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF JOHN MARSHALL 5 (1939); see, e.g., The
Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 120 (1825) (the law of nations "which has received the
assent of all must be the law of all") (Marshall, C.J.).




ration [concerning the ICJ] is called a temporary termination, an
amendment or something else, in the absence of Senate or congres-
sional concurrence," Professor Michael Glennon concludes, "his act
is unconstitutional.""9 The remedy for such improper executive
actions, therefore, lies initially in Congress, not the courts. Failure
of Congress to act bespeaks a breakdown in the separation of pow-
ers and the checks and balances that the men of 1787 wrote into
the formal Constitution. It will not do to argue that an appropria-
tion to fund the Contras in Nicaragua is a de facto ratification of
the Executive's constitutionally improper acts. All knowledgeable
people know that in voting to appropriate money, a Congressman
is not necessarily approving of the continuation of a conflict, re-
gardless of whether the appropriation act refers to that particular
war. The Supreme Court has never specifically approved such ex-
traconstitutional Presidential actions as the Korean and Vietnam
"wars," and as Professor Henkin notes, the Court never has said
that a President may violate international law.
In some respects, executive actions with respect to Central
America are an example of what above was called raison d'gtat.
Such actions are Machiavellian, pure and simple. Machiavelli
wrote: "It is a sound maxim that reprehensible actions may be jus-
tified by their effects, and . . when the effect is good . . . it al-
ways justifies the action. '40 This, of course, is a variation on the
old means-ends theme: do the ends justify the means? By no
means may it be said that the stated aims of the United States'
Central American policy are proper, although some international
lawyers-for example, Professor John Norton Moore-strive val-
iantly (but futilely, in my judgment) to justify the aims. 41 By any
criterion, the means chosen are reprehensible. We do not yet know
what the "effects"-Machiavelli's word-of our latest Central
American adventure will be. How do we know that they will be
"good," either in the short or long term? What we do know is that
the United States employs the ICJ as an instrument of pol-
icy-going to it when deemed desirable (as in the Iranian hostages
situation) and thumbing our nose at it when the knife cuts the
other way. That is an odd posture for a nation that trumpets that
it follows the rule of law.
39. Glennon, Nicaragua v. United States: Constitutionality of U.S. Modification of
ICJ Jurisdiction, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 682, 689 (1985).
40. I N. MACHIAVELLI, supra note 9, § 9, at 234.
41. Moore, The Secret War in Central America and the Future of World Order, 80
AM. J. INT'L L. 43 (1986).
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The net conclusion is utterly clear. The President is failing to
adhere to his constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws-in
this instance, international law.
VI.
There is little to be said by way of conclusion. This Essay has
been a tour d'horizon of the President's take-care duty under Arti-
cle II of the formal Constitution. My conclusions already have
been stated. It remains only to make two points. First, to hold the
Chief Executive to his constitutional obligation under the faithful-
execution clause would not make him a mere "messenger boy," as
Chief Justice Carl Vinson asserted in his dissent in the Steel
Seizure Case. The President would still have a large amount of
power, whether formally granted or informally taken. The consti-
tutional scheme, however, calls for what Woodrow Wilson labeled
as cooperation and Dean Gerhard Casper has said is coordination
between the two avowedly political branches of government. Con-
gress' failure in its bounden constitutional duties to check the Ex-
ecutive when necessary, as well as to cooperate, does not dilute the
point. The constitutional command is for collective decisionmak-
ing. Government by executive fiat runs contrary to the spirit and
the letter of what the framers wrought in 1787.
Second, there is in the final analysis little that individuals can
do when the take-care duty allegedly is flouted. True enough, on
occasion-as in Ameron-the judicial process can be invoked in an
effort to halt the trend toward a regal Presidency. The very costs
of litigation, as well as the millions of decisions affecting individu-
als (natural and corporate) made annually by the Executive, how-
ever, do not augur well for faithful adherence to the faithful-execu-
tion duty. Government lawyers always can be found, as former
Secretary of State Dean Rusk has remarked, to create a counter-
pane of putative legality over any action the President desires.
Said Rusk: "There are times when I think that the [State Depart-
ment] legal adviser has been put in the position of a client who
says to [his] lawyer-this is what I'm going to do and you do your
best with the law of the matter. ' 42 That is precisely what occurred
with respect to the ICJ, although it must be added that the legal
adviser's justification was weak and unpersuasive.
The ultimate meaning is obvious. The United States is gov-
erned by an institution with three supposedly equal branches, but
42. Saikowski, International Law, Christ. Science Mon., Apr. 4, 1986.
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one is primus inter pares-it is "more equal" than the others. In
theory the Congress and the Supreme Court may be preeminent,
but in constitutional fact the President is dominant. The uncer-
tainties and ambiguities in constitutional practice under the take-
care clause illustrate one of the ways in which this nation is ruled
by a system of executive hegemony.
